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AN INCOMPETENT INDIVIDUAL'S
RIGHT TO DIE
I. Introduction
Judge Cardozo once stated that "[e]very human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body."' This statement represents the common law
right of an individual to refuse medical treatment.2 For example, a
doctor who performs medical treatment without the patient's consent
may be guilty of assault 3 even if the treatment is beneficial or neces-
sary to keep the patient alive.4 Thus, the individual's right to deter-
mine the course of his medical treatment supersedes the doctor's
obligation to treat the patient.5
1. Schloendorf v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914).
2. This common law right has been recognized repeatedly by the courts.
In 1891 .. .the United States Supreme Court stated, '[n]o right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority
of law.'
McConnell v. Beverly Enter., 209 Conn. 692, 701, 553 A.2d 596, 601 (1989) (citing
Union Pacific Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485,
492-93, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 78 (1986); Delio v. Westchester County
Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (2d Dep't 1987).
Many cases have held that a patient's right also arises from the constitutional right to
privacy. The United States Supreme Court has recognized a right to privacy in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109
S. Ct. 3040 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965). This constitutional right to privacy encompasses a patient's decision to de-
cline medical treatment under certain circumstances. Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431,
458-60, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 539-40 (2d Dep't 1980), modified sub nom. In re Storar, 52
N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); see also
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 738, 370
N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977); Matter of Quinlin, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Recognizing the right to refuse medical treatment as based
on common law, rather than on the right to privacy, many states have implied the right
to refuse medical treatment in their state constitutions. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior
Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (1986); In re Guardianship
of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Quinlin, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at
663; Matter of Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983); Rasmussen v.
Flemming, 154 Ariz. 207, 215, 741 P.2d 674, 682 (1987); Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 492, 495
N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
3. The doctor may be liable in damages except in emergency cases in which the
patient is unconscious and it is necessary to operate before consent can be obtained.
Schloendorf, 211 N.Y. at 130, 105 N.E. at 93.
4. Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at 454, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 536.
5. Under certain circumstances, the individual's right to determine the course of his
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In New York,6 the due process clause of the state constitution is the
source of a patient's right to refuse medical treatment.7 The patient's
choice, moreover, cannot be disregarded unless there is a compelling
state interest.8 Before the medical treatment is terminated, the patient
must be fully informed of, and understand the consequences of, such
actions.9 This requirement of "informed consent" means that before
exercising his right to refuse medical treatment, a patient must receive
information from his physician regarding at a minimum, the specific
procedure or treatment involved, the reasonably foreseeable risks in-
volved, and alternatives for care or treatment.?° The individual's de-
cision as to treatment is then made based on these objective factors, as
well as any subjective values or beliefs.' This combination of subjec-
tive and objective factors results in a decision which reflects the "best
interest" of the individual.12
An individual does 'not lose his right to refuse medical treatment
even if he is adjudicated incompetent, 13 or if he is found by his physi-
medical treatment may have to yield to superior state interests. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d
363, 377, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
6. Presently, each state may determine the scope of a patient's right to refuse treat-
ment. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, has granted certiorari in a case
involving an individual's constitutional right to remove a feeding tube. Cruzan v. Har-
mon, 760 S.W.2d 408, (1988), cert. granted, 109 S.Ct. 3240 (1989).
7. Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 484, 492-93, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 78
(1986); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2504(1), 2803-c(3), 2805-d,
(McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1989); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 405.25(a)(7)
(1987).
8. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
9. Any decision involving medical treatment must be an informed one.
There are three basic prerequisites for informed consent: the patient must have
the capacity to reason and make judgments, the decision must be made volunta-
rily and without coercion, and the patient must have a clear understanding of
the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment alternatives or nontreatment,
along with a full understanding of the nature of the disease and the prognosis.
Wanzer, Adelstein, Cranford, Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safer, Stone, Taussig & Van
Eys, The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 955, 957 (1984) [hereinafter Physician's Responsibility]; see also Cruzan, 760
S.W.2d 408; N.Y. COMp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, §§ 405.25(a)(6), 414.14(a)(4),
414.14(b) (1987); Note, Wrongful Birth Actions, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J., 27, 38 (1989).
10. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 405.25(a)(6) (1987).
11. Matter of O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 537-38, 531 N.E.2d 607, 617-18, 534
N.Y.S.2d 886, 896 (1988) (Hancock, J., concurring); id. at 551-552, 531 N.E.2d at 626,
534 N.Y.S.2d at 905 (Simons, J., dissenting).
12. Id.; Note, A Patient's Last Rights-Termination of Medical Care-An Analysis of
New York's In re Storar, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1380, 1403 (1982) [hereinafter A Patient's Last
Rights].
13. The New York Public Health Law states that an individual does not lose his right
to refuse medical treatment if the individual is adjudicated incompetent according to state
law. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 414.14(b) (1987).
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cian to be medically incompetent.14 The state simply denies him the
opportunity to exercise this right because an incompetent individual
does not have the capacity to render an informed decision, and there-
fore cannot meet the requirement of "informed-consent."' 5 One solu-
tion to this dilemma is the appointment of a surrogate. A surrogate
will step into the shoes of the incompetent individual and exercise his
right to refuse medical treatment on his behalf after considering objec-
tive and subjective factors. 16 The objective factors include those of
informed consent, such as the medical condition of the patient, the
nature of the treatment involved, the reasonably foreseeable risks, and
the alternatives for care or treatment. 17 The subjective factors include
the patient's subjective values such as the particular patient's moral,
ethical and religious beliefs.18 By considering both objective and sub-
jective factors, the surrogate would make a decision as if there were
informed consent, and as if the surrogate shared the patient's values
and beliefs.19 The surrogate's decision, therefore, would reflect the
best interest of the incompetent patient.2 °
Presently, New York courts will not appoint a surrogate to make
an informed decision on behalf of the incompetent individual.21 In-
14. Id.
15. While the right to refuse medical treatment extends to the incompetent individ-
ual, this right is qualified by the requirement that the individual be able to make an
informed decision. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, §§ 414.14(a)(4), 414.14(b);
see also Saunders v. State, 129 Misc. 2d 45, 51, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 514 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1985).
16. Matter of O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 540, 531 N.E.2d 607, 619, 534 N.Y.S.2d
886, 898 (1988) (Simons, J., dissenting).
17. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
18. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 537-38, 531 N.E.2d at 617-18, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
19. Allowing a surrogate to make the decision regarding additional medical treatment
on behalf of an incompetent individual has been recognized by many state courts. See,
e.g., In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 414, 529 A.2d 434, 444 (1987); see also Rasmussen v.
Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 219, 741 P.2d 674, 686 (1987); Conservatorship of Drabick, 200
Cal. App. 3d 185, 186, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 841 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 399 (1988);
Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 1277, 482 A.2d 713 (1984); In re
Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 159 (Del. Ch. 1980); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v.
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc.,
398 Mass. 417, 442, 497 N.E.2d 626, 640 (1986); In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357
N.W.2d 332, 337-38 (Minn. 1984); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 365, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231
(1985); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 128, 660 P.2d 738, 746 (1983), modified sub nom.
In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984); In re Guardian-
ship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 554, 747 P.2d 445, 449 (1987).
20. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 552, 531 N.E.2d at 626, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 905 (Simons, J.,
dissenting).
21. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 382-83, 420 N.E.2d 64, 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 276,
cert. denied., 454 U.S. 858 (1981). The New York Courts do allow for the appointment
of a surrogate in very limited circumstances: if the individual is a child, or if the individ-
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stead, New York courts invoke the subjective intent rule22 which
seeks to ascertain what the incompetent individual actually desired
when last competent.23 In applying this rule, the courts examine past
statements of the individual to determine what the specific patient
would decide if he was capable of making an informed decision.24
The subjective intent of the patient can be determined if the individual
previously stated the particular procedure or treatment he wishes to
avoid,25 and the individual is in a medical condition "qualitatively
similar"26 to the condition contemplated at the time the past state-
ments were made.27 Once the subjective intent of the individual is
determined, the court will order the treatment to be terminated ab-
sent a compelling state interest.28
In applying the subjective intent rule the court does not consider
the objective factors of informed consent.29 As a result, the subjective
intent rule does not adequately protect the person who is unable to
articulate his post-illness desires, or did not have the knowledge or the
foresight to make his subjective intentions known. 0 Furthermore, the
incompetent individual is making a subjective, pre-illness, decision on
less information than the individual capable of rendering an informed
decision.3'
This Note argues that in order to enable an incompetent individual
to exercise an informed decision regarding the termination of medical
treatment, a surrogate should be appointed who can determine the
best interest of the patient by taking into account objective as well as
subjective factors. Part II examines the subjective intent rule devised
by the New York Court of Appeals, and reveals the problems with
ual has appointed his own surrogate before he became incapacitated, pursuant to the
durable power of attorney statute. See infra notes 90, 144.
22. Matter of O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 550, 531 N.E.2d 607, 616, 534 N.Y.S.2d
886, 895 (1988); see infra note 32.
23. Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 470, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 546 (1980); In re
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 378, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274.
24. Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at 470, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 546; Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 378, 420
N.E.2d at 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
25. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 379-80, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
26. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 550, 531 N.E.2d at 625, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 904. (Simons, J.,
dissenting).
27. Id. at 532-33, 531 N.E.2d at 614, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
28. See, e.g., O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d,886; Storar, 52
N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266; Elbaum v. Grace Plaza Great Neck, 148
A.D.2d 244, 544 N.Y.S.2d 840 (2d Dep't 1989); Delio v. Westchester County Center, 129
A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (2d Dep't 1987).
29. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 530, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
30. See infra notes 85-118 and accompanying text..
31. See supra note 10 and accompanying text, setting forth the information a compe-
tent individual must receive before rendering a decision to terminate medical treatment.
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this rule when applied to specific medical situations. Part III argues
that because the subjective intent rule fails to adequately protect a
patient who is incapable of rendering an informed decision, the rule
should be supplemented by the appointment of a surrogate who will
consider both the subjective factors of the subjective intent rule, and
the objective factors of informed consent. Only in this way will the
best interest of the incompetent patient be served. Part IV proposes a
statute which would allow the appointment of a surrogate and would
clarify the rights of an individual who is incapable of rendering an
informed decision about his medical treatment.
II. New York's Subjective Intent Rule
The subjective intent rule is a judge-made rule consisting of an ex-
amination of past statements made by the patient when the patient
was medically competent. a2 The court analyzes these past statements
to determine what this patient would decide regarding his current
medical treatment.33 First, the court determines if the patient, when
competent, communicated his desire not to be sustained by a specific
type of medical treatment.3 4 Second, the court determines if the pa-
tient, when competent, specified the ultimate medical condition in
which he would decline medical treatment.35 If there is clear and con-
vincing evidence3 6 of these past intentions, the relief requested is bal-
anced against four state interests:37 (1) the protection of third
parties;3 (2) the prevention of suicide;39 (3) the maintenance of the
ethical integrity of the medical profession;' and (4) the preservation
32. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 858 (1981).
33. Id. at 379-80, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Eichner v.. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 468-69,. 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 545-46. The
Eichner court rejected the ."beyond a reasonable doubt" standard used in criminal cases:
"by no stretch of the imagination can the [s]tate be deemed to be 'taking life' in a matter
analogous to the imposition of a death penalty in a criminal action." Id.
The Eichner court also rejected the "preponderance of the credible evidence" standard
because the decision to terminate medical treatment involves weightier issues than does a
dispute over money. The court ultimately chose the middle-tier standard of proof-
"clear and convincing"-because it requires a finding of high probability. See also Storar,
52 N.Y.2d at 378-79,420 N.E.2d at 71-72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274; Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
37. Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at 465, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 466, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
40. Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 466, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 544 (1980).
1989]
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and sanctity of life.4 '
The weight accorded to protection of third parties will differ from
case to case. Unless the state has asserted a substantial state interest,
the patient's choice to refuse medical treatment will prevail. For ex-
ample, in Matter of Fosmire,42 the New York Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the state's interest in protecting a minor child will not
overcome a patient's right to refuse medical treatment where the child
is assured of parental support and care by the child's father and ex-
tended family.43
The state's interest in preventing suicide will rarely overcome a pa-
tient's right to refuse medical treatment regarding termination of a
medical procedure.' Suicide is the result of a self-inflicted injury
which requires a specific intent to die, and the courts have held that
the individual who desires to terminate medical treatment does not
have the same intent as the individual who commits suicide.45 A
problem arises, however, where a person has attempted suicide and is
subsequently being sustained by a medical procedure.4 6 In this situa-
tion, the request to terminate medical treatment is an extension of a
suicide attempt, and the state's interest in preventing suicide must be
balanced against a patient's right to refuse medical treatment.4 7
The third state interest is maintaining the ethical integrity of the
medical profession. In many situations, the health care facility will
refuse to terminate medical treatment in order to maintain its per-
41. Id.
42. N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22, 1990, at 21, col. 1 (Ct. App. Jan. 18, 1990).
43. Id. In Fosmire, an adult Jehovah's witness refused to consent to blood transfu-
sions following the cesarean birth of her child. The court rejected the hospital's argu-
ment that it is always in the child's best interest to have two parents, and held that, under
the circumstances of this case, there was no substantial state interest which would over-
come the patient's right to refuse blood transfusions. Id. Prior to the Fosmire decision,
treatment had been ordered against expressed wishes when an innocent third party would
suffer if the patient died. For example, a woman who was 18 weeks pregnant refused to
consent to receiving a life-saving blood transfusion for religious reasons; the court held
that the state's interest in protecting the life of a mid-term fetus outweighed the patient's
right to refuse the transfusion. In re Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 1008, 491
N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (1985).
44. The state will intervene to prevent suicide. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 35.10[4], [5](b)
(McKinney 1981). But, declining medical care is not a suicidal act. Eichner, 73 A.D.2d
at 467, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 544; Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 377 n.6, 420 N.E.2d at 71 n.6, 438
N.Y.S.2d at 273 n.6.
45. Id.; Byrn, Compulsory Life Saving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1, 18 (1975) [hereinafter Lifesaving Treatment].
46. Lifesaving Treatment, supra note 45, at 17.
47. Id.; see also Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at 467, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 544. Courts have consist-
ently held that where a patient's injury is not self-inflicted, the state's interest in prevent-
ing suicide will not overcome a patient's right to refuse medical treatment. Id.
48. Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at 466, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
[Vol. XVII
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ceived ethical integrity.49 The courts, however, have consistently
ruled that a health care facility's interest in maintaining its ethical
integrity is not compelling and will not override a decision to termi-
nate medical treatment.50 The courts recognize that this interest has
been "overcome, or at least sufficiently lessened, by prevailing medical
ethics which do not require medical intervention at all costs."51
The state's interest in preserving life is generally the most signifi-
cant of the four interests because the state has a strong interest in
protecting the lives of its citizens.5 2 If, however, a physician deter-
mines that this patient is in a condition in which he has no hope of
recovery, additional medical treatment may not serve to advance that
interest.5 3
A. Determining An Individual's Subjective Intent
The New York Court of Appeals applied the subjective intent rule
for the first time in Matter of Storar,54 where the court consolidated
two cases in which termination of medical treatment was sought on
behalf of an individual incapable of rendering an informed decision
regarding medical care.55 In one case, a patient was in a persistent
49. Brief on behalf of Amicus Curiae N.Y. Medical College at 2, Matter of
O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988). In this brief, N.Y.
Medical College argued that the removal of a naso-gastric tube would conflict with the
ethical standards of the college:
for over 128 years the [m]edical [c]ollege has educated countless numbers of
medical students and physicians in accordance with the Hippocratic Oath and
principles of common humanity to care for the sick and to preserve their lives
and health from the effects of disease.., never has the [m]edical [clollege been
challenged to ... teach ... that physicians should stand by idly and observe a
conscious, responsive patient disabled from making his or her own treatment
decisions die from thirst and starvation.
Id.; Elbaum v. Grace Plaza Great Neck, 148 A.D.2d 244, 255, 544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 847 (2d
Dep't 1989).
50. See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
51. Elbaum, 148 A.D.2d at 255, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 847. According to decisions in
cases where medical ethics conflicted with a patient's wishes regarding medical treatment,
the patient's wishes prevailed. Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 493, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341,
504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 78 (1986); Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1,
25, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 693 (2d Dep't 1987); Elbaum, 148 A.D.2d at 255, 544 N.Y.S.2d
840 at 847 ("[i]f the patient's right to informed consent is to have any meaning at all, it
must be accorded respect even when it conflicts with the advice of the doctor or the
values of the medical profession as a whole")(citations omitted).
52. Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at 465, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
53. Id. The state's interest in preserving life weakens as the patient's prognosis be-
comes hopeless. Id.
54. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981).
55. Id.
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vegetative state, and was thus medically incompetent.56 A couple of
months before his final hospitalization, when competent, he had ex-
pressed his desire not to be sustained by a respirator in the event that
he was in a vegetative state.57 The court authorized discontinuance of
the respirator, holding that the patient's intentions were proven by
clear and convincing evidence, and that the patient was in the exact
condition contemplated at the time he expressed the statements.58 In
determining whether the state had a compelling interest which would
weigh against discontinuance of the respirator, the court concluded
that there were no compelling state interests that outweighed the pa-
tient's right to refuse medical treatment.59 Specifically, the court
noted that there was no state interest in protecting third parties be-
cause the patient had no dependents.' Furthermore, there was no
state interest in preventing suicide since the requisite intent to die was
not present; rather, the patient's intent was to forego extraordinary
measures of medical technology, thus allowing nature to run its
course. 6' The court also found that the integrity of the medical pro-
fession was not at issue because medical ethics permits the termina-
tion of life support for a terminally ill patient in a persistent vegetative
state if the patient so desires.62 Finally, the patient's right to be re-
moved from the respirator was not outweighed by the state's interest
in preserving life.63 The court concluded that a person in a perma-
nent vegetative state with no hope of recovery has "no health ... for
the [s]tate to protect."'
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court applied
the subjective intent rule to a case involving the removal of a naso-
gastric tube in Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center.65 A naso-
56. Id. at 371, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S. at 270.
57. Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 529 (1980). The
Eichner court defined a vegetative state as "a state where the individual is partially re-
sponsive . . .but . . .has no significant cognitive functions," and has only a remote
possibility of regaining any cognitive functions. Id. The New York Court of Appeals
found that the patient was in this condition. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 379-80, 420 N.E.2d at
72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
58. In re of Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 380, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274
(1981).
59. Id. at 377, 420 N.E.2d at 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
60. Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 466, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 544 (1980).
61. Id. at 467, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
62. Id. at 466, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
63. Id. at 465, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
64. Id.; see infra notes 85-96 for a discussion of the second consolidated case in this
opinion.
65. 129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (2d Dep't 1987). The Appellate Division stated
that common law principles apply since the New York Court of Appeals declined to
310 [Vol. XVII
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gastric tube, also known as a feeding tube, is a commonly used
method of administering artificial nutrition and hydration when the
patient is no longer capable of swallowing.66 In Delio, the patient, in a
persistent vegetative state, was medically incompetent and was being
sustained by feeding tubes.67 When the patient's wife sought removal
of the feeding tubes, the court granted the requested relief, finding
clear and convincing evidence68 of the patient's intent that medication
and nutrition be withheld.69 In its opinion, the court emphasized that
this patient had a doctoral degree in physiology and had received ex-
tensive scientific training in medically. related subjects.70 The patient
had expressed repeatedly to his relatives and professional collegues
that he felt it was "'horrible' and 'appalling' to keep a person alive in
a vegetative state by artificial infusions of medication and nutrition."'"
He asked his wife and mother to promise that they would not allow
him to live for even one day in a chronic vegetative state.72 The pa-
tient urged his mother to execute a living will, 73 and intended to exe-
cute one himself, but felt that since he was only thirty-three years old,
he had plenty of time to do so. 74
The court further held that there was no compelling state interest
which would override the decision to remove the feeding tubes: there
were no dependents involved to create a state interest in protecting
third parties,7 5 and since the injury was not self-inflicted there was no
reach the constitutional issue in previous right to die cases. Id. at 14, 516 N.Y.S.2d at
686:
66. "A tube is inserted into the nose, down the back of the mouth, down the length of
the esophagus, into the stomach." Artificial Nutrition & Hydration, SOCIETY FOR THE
RIGHT To DIE at 6 (available at the Fordham Urban Law Journal office).
67. Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 4, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677,
680 (2d Dep't 1987). The court extended prior law by holding that nutrition and hydra-
tion constituted medical treatment that could be removed. Id. One month prior to Delio,
the New York Supreme Court granted a petition which requested that a gastrostomy not
be performed on a comatose patient in a persistent vegetative state. See Workmen's Cir-
cle Home v. Fink, 135 Misc. 2d 270, 273-74, 514 N.Y.S.2d 893, 896 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Co.
1978). Although the court reasoned that this was an active surgical procedure, the court
would not authorize removal of antibiotics and nutrition through intravenous feeding. Id.
68. Delio, 129 A.D.2d at 22, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
69. Id. at 7, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 682. Nutrition and hydration by artificial means was
viewed by the court as being the same as a respirator, and therefore was evaluated as
another form of artificial life support. Id. at 19, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
70. Id. at 19, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
71. Id. at 7, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
72. Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 4, 516 N.Y.S.2d 617,
680 (2d Dep't 1987).
73. See infra notes 132-42 and accompanying text for an explanation of living wills.
74. Delio, 129 A.D.2d at 7, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
75. Id. at 25, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
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state interest in preventing suicide.76 The court also indicated that the
state's interest in maintaining the integrity of the medical profession
was not compelling. 7 Although the medical center which housed the
patient claimed that the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration
was a violation of its ethical standards, 7 the court did not find this
interest compelling enough to deny relief because prevailing medical
ethics do not require medical intervention for a patient with no hope
of improvement.79 Instead, the court ordered the medical center to
transfer the patient to a suitable facility or to his home so that his
stated wishes could be fulfilled."0 Finally, the state interest in preserv-
ing life did not outweigh the individual's right to refuse medical treat-
ment because, according to the court, the state's interest in preserving
the life of a patient in a persistent vegetative condition with no hope of
improvement is not compelling. 1
New York courts, therefore, have set up a limited scenario where a
patient, before becoming incompetent, may provide for discontinu-
ance of treatment in egregious situations.8 2 If the patient has the so-
phistication, foresight and ability to express the type of medical
treatment and the ultimate medical condition that he seeks to avoid
before he becomes medically incompetent, the patient's subjective in-
tent can be determined and his choice will prevail.8 3
B. Consideration of Objective Factors
The individual who could not make his subjective intentions known
before he became incompetent will be forced to have medical treat-
ment administered, even if it offers no reasonable hope of improve-
76. Id. at 24, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
77. Id. at 26, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
78. Id.
79. Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677
(2d Dep't 1987).
80. Id. at 26, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 693-94.
81. Id. at 22, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 691. The court in Delio stated:
Although the absence of a terminal illness may implicate the [s]tate's concern to
preserve life, this interest is outweighed by the individual's right to avoid being
preserved in a vegetative condition which, when he was mentally competent, he
considered degrading and without human dignity.
Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded that the use of a feeding tube for a patient in
a permanent vegetative state did not serve to advance the state's interest in protecting life.
Id. at 24, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
82. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 848 (1981); Defio, 129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677.
83. Delio, 129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677. See also Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great
Neck, 148 A.D.2d 244, 544 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1989). The Appellate Division held that the
patient's past declarations met New York's clear and convincing standard.
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ment and causes needless pain and suffering.84 The second case in
Matter of Storar 5 involved a mother who sought to discontinue the
blood transfusions being performed on her retarded adult son.86 This
patient had irreversible cancer of the bladder and the lungs, giving
him an estimated lifespan of three to six months.87 The court denied
the mother's request, and held that the intent of the patient could not
be determined.' Because the subjective intent rule evaluates only the
subjective intentions of the patient while he was competent, and this
patient was born incompetent, the court could not apply the subjec-
tive intent rule. 89 The court ordered the transfusions to continue, rea-
soning that the patient had the mentality of an infant, and that
although a parent has a right to consent to medical treatment on be-
half of his child,90 the state has a compelling interest in protecting the
health and welfare of the child.9'
Because the patient's subjective intentions in Matter of Storar could
never be known, the court disregarded the subjective intent rule.92
The fifty-two year-old patient was evaluated as an infant, and the
state's interest in protecting the health and welfare of children out-
weighed any decision to terminate medical treatment. 93 Moreover, the
court's reasoning in refusing to apply the subjective intent rule to an
adult whose subjective intent could not be known would logically ex-
tend to children as well. 94
Since the subjective intent rule could not apply in this situation, the
court should have appointed his mother as surrogate to make an in-
formed decision on her son's behalf. By considering the objective fac-
tors associated with informed consent-her son's medical condition,
the nature of the prescribed transfusions (including both the benefits
and the pain and suffering), the risks involved with the procedure (in-
cluding her son's prognosis with and without the treatment) and any
available alternatives-the best interest of this individual could have
84. See infra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
85. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981).
86. Id. at 369, 420 N.E.2d at 66, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
87. Id. at 381, 420 N.E. 2d at 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
88. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 369, 420 N.E.2d 64, 66, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 268
(1981).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275; N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2504(2) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1989).
91. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
92. Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
93. Id. at 381, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
94. Matter of O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 541, 531 N.E.2d 607, 620, 534 N.Y.S.2d
886, 899 (1988) (Simons, J., dissenting).
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been determined." The effect of not applying a best interest approach
in this situation was to compel a procedure which only prolonged the
patient's pain and suffering.96
If a patient does not possess the sophistication and foresight to
make his exact intentions known, the subjective intent of the patient
cannot be determined.97  In Matter of O'Connor,98 a seventy-seven
year-old incompetent, but conscious9 9 woman was being sustained by
intravenous feeding.'0° When her daughters sought to withhold the
insertion of a feeding tube,'0 the New York Court of Appeals denied
relief because the patient did not clearly and convincingly articulate
her specific desire not to be sustained by feeding tubes.1"2
Testimony established that the patient had previously expressed a
desire to refuse artificial life support in the event that she was unable
to care for herself.10 3 Although the patient was in a condition in
which she was unable to care for herself, the court denied the petition
95. See supra notes 17-20.
96. A Patient's Last Rights, supra note 12, at 1395.
97. See infra notes 98-120 and accompanying text.
98. 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
99. Matter of O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 523, 531 N.E.2d 607, 608, 534 N.Y.S.2d
886, 887 (1988). The testimony established that O'Connor would not recover significant
mental capacity. She was, however, neither terminally ill, comatose, nor in a persistent
vegetative state, but rather, was awake and conscious, could feel pain, and responded
sporadically to simple questions. Id. at 533, 531 N.E.2d at 615, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
O'Connor was the first right to refuse treatment case before the Court of Appeals which
involved a patient who, while incompetent, was not comatose, terminally ill, or in a per-
manent vegetative state. See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 848 (1981) (involving a terminally ill retarded man);
Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980) (involving a patient in a
persistent vegetative state). Furthermore, there was no case before the New York
Supreme Court Appellate Division involving a patient in the same medical condition as
O'Connor. See, e.g., Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 516
N.Y.S.2d 677 (2d Dep't 1987); Elbaum v. Grace Plaza Great Neck, 148 A.D.2d 244, 544
N.Y.S.2d 840 (2d Dep't 1989); see also Goldberg & Liptak, High Court Limits "Right-To-
Die" Decisions, MEDPRO UPDATE 9 (Dec. 1988) (stating that the O'Connor case was the
first decision in New York involving an individual who was neither comatose, in a vegeta-
tive state, nor terminally ill).
100. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 524, 531 N.E.2d at 609, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 888. The pa-
tient suffered from a diminished gag reflex which made her unable to swallow. Since
intravenous feeding works only for several weeks, a naso-gastric tube was required to
provide the patient with the nourishment needed to keep her alive. Id.
101. Id.
102. The patient's statements were too general to imply that she would object to a
feeding tube. Id. at 535, 531 N.E.2d at 616, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 895. (Hancock, J.,
concurring).
103. Id. at 527, 531 N.E.2d at 611, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 890. The patient's daughter testi-
fied that her mother, when competent, stated that she did not want to continue living if
she could not "take care of herself and make her own decisions." Id. The patient's
former co-worker confirmed this, remarking that the patient "felt that nature should take
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and ordered the insertion of the feeding tube."° The court did not
find clear and convincing evidence that while still competent, the pa-
tient had made "a firm and settled commitment"' 1 5 to decline this
specific type of medical assistance under these particular circum-
stances.1o6 The court noted that the patient had repeated statements
over a number of years regarding her desire to decline life-saving
treatments, but the court treated the statements as "immediate reac-
tions to the unsettling experience of seeing or hearing about another's
unnecessarily prolonged death."' 10 7 The court further noted that this
patient was neither in a coma nor in a vegetative state, but was con-
scious, could feel pain and responded sporadically to simple ques-
tons. 10 8 The court concluded that there was no evidence suggesting
that she contemplated declining medical treatment for her current
condition. 1o
The requirement that a prospective patient articulate the type of life
support and the medical condition which he' seeks to avoid further
restricts a person's right to refuse treatment. 110 A lay person is gener-
ally unfamiliar with the constant technological advances in medicine,
and therefore, cannot accurately predict the precise form of treatment
he may one day wish to terminate, or the precise condition he will
suffer from.' For example, in O'Connor, because the patient did not
contemplate that she would be sustained by feeding tubes, the court
could not determine her intent. 112 As physicians learn of new meth-
ods for prolonging life, the courts, applying the subjective intent rule,
its course and not use further artificial means." Id. at 526, 531 N.E.2d at 611, 534
N.Y.S.2d at 890.
104. Id. at 527, 531 N.E.2d at 611, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
105. Id. at 531, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
106. Id. at 534, 531 N.E.2d at 615, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 894. The patient's daughters
testified that they did not know the patient's view on artificial nutrition and hydration.
Id. at 527, 531 N.E.2d at 611, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 890. The court held that since the pa-
tient's views did not include termination of a feeding tube, the patient's subjective intent
could not be determined. Id..
107. Id. at 532, 531 N.E.2d at 614, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
108. Id. at 533, 531 N.E.2d at 615, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
109. See supra note 102.
110. Matter of O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 550, 531 N.E.2d 607, 625, 534 N.Y.S.2d
886, 904 (1988).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 542, 531 N.E.2d at 621, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 900. (Simons, J., dissenting).
While the court admitted that the patient cannot foresee the future, the procedure and
condition must be qualitatively similar to those now presented. The Court did not sug-
gest a way to determine when a person's past expression is qualitatively similar to the
circumstances at issue. To ensure termination of life support, a patient must communi-
cate the nature of the procedure and condition with utmost specificity. Id. at 551, 531
N.E.2d at 626, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 905 (Simons, J., dissenting).
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are less likely to permit the removal of life support; if a patient did not
know about a method of treatment in the first place, he could not
have explicitly rejected it. l1 3
A patient will also have difficulty anticipating a specific future con-
dition.'14 For a patient to forsee his ultimate medical condition would
require him "to exercise foresight [he does] not possess."1'1 5
O'Connor specified that in the event she could not care for herself, she
did not want machinery sustaining her life.1 16 She stated to her
daughters and friends that she would never want to lose her dignity
before she passed away, and that nature should take its course in the
event that she was being sustained by life support machinery.1 7 The
court, however, could not determine whether the inability to care for
herself included her present condition, and thus could not determine
her subjective intent. 8
If the court had allowed one of O'Connor's family members to be
appointed as her surrogate, this family member could have considered
O'Connor's subjective beliefs and values as well as her medical condi-
tion, the nature of the treatment, the risks involved with the proce-
dure, and whether any other alternatives were available. 19 In this
way, the objective factors of informed consent would be considered
along with the subjective factors of the intent rule, and the best inter-
est of O'Connor could have been determined.1 20
III. The Appointment of a Surrogate
New York law should require that a surrogate be designated who
would exercise the right to refuse medical treatment on behalf of the
incompetent individual.' 21 The surrogate, however, should consider
not only the individual's past statements, but also any subjective in-
tentions of the patient that fall outside the scope of the subjective in-
113. See id. at 552, 531 N.E.2d at 626, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 905 (Simons, J., dissenting).
The only way to ensure that a patient's wish will be carried out is to communicate any
desires with the greatest degree of specificity; see, e.g., Elbaum v. Grace Plaza Great
Neck, 148 A.D.2d 244, 544 N.Y.S.2d 840 (2d Dep't 1989) (patient had pleaded repeat-
edly to family members that no machines, feeding tubes or antibiotics be administered if
she were ever in a vegetative state).
114. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 549, 531 N.E.2d at 625, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 904. (Simons, J.,
dissenting).
115. Id.
116. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
117. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 527, 531 N.E.2d at 611, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
118. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 16-17.
120. See supra notes 18-20.
121. See supra note 21.
[Vol. XVII
RIGHT TO DIE
tent rule. 122 These more "general" subjective intentions consist of the
patient's moral, ethical, religious or other values which are relevant to
the termination of life support. 2 3 In addition, the surrogate, after
consulting with the attending physician, should consider a number of
objective factors.'24 These objective factors include the medical con-
dition of the patient (including the patient's mental and physical func-
tioning), 25 the nature of the prescribed medical assistance (including
both the benefits and the pain and suffering), 126 the risks involved (in-
cluding the patient's prognosis-the patient's life expectancy and pos-
sibility of recovery), and any alternatives which are available.'27 The
surrogate can determine the best interest of the patient by consider-
ing, at a minimum, the subjective factors of the intent rule and the
objective factors of informed consent. 128 As a further safeguard of the
patient's best interest, a hospital ethics committee should be formed 29
to consult with the attending physician and give the surrogate its
opinion as to the best interest of this patient. 31 If the surrogate de-
cides to terminate medical treatment, and the matter is subsequently
disputed, a court will determine whether there exists a compelling
state interest which overrides the surrogate's decision. 13
A. Making Subjective Intentions Known
A patient may make his subjective values and beliefs known by ex-
pressing them in writing. This writing may be in the form of a living
will, which consists of an individual's intention to terminate specific
types of medical treatment in the event that he is in a specific situa-
tion.1 32 A living will provides a written directive to family, physicians
and hospital authorities of the patient's desire regarding medical
122. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 537, 531 N.E.2d at 617, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 896 (Hancock,
J., concurring); A Patient's Last Rights, supra note 12, at 1403.
123. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 537, 531 N.E.2d at 617, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 896 (Hancock,
J., concurring).
124. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
125. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 537, 531 N.E.2d at 617, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 896 (Hancock,
J., concurring).
126. Id.
127. Matter of O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 537, 531 N.E.2d 607, 617, 534 N.Y.S.2d
886, 896 (1988).
128. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
129. See A Patient's Last Rights, supra note 12, at 1403; Stone, The Right to Die: New
Problems for Law & Medicine & Psychiatry, 37 EMORY L.J. 627, 637 (1988) [hereinafter
The Right to Die].
130. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 440 (1988).
131. Id. at 441.
132. Note, Living Wills in New York: Are They Valid?, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1369,
1372-75 (1987) [hereinafter Living Wills].
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treatment. 133 Although New York does not have legislation declaring
a living will valid, the New York courts have honored an individual's
living will as evidence of an informed decision exercised by the pa-
tient, when competent.1 34
The New York Court in Saunders v. State 35 honored the patient's
living will, holding that the document was evidence of "the most per-
suasive quality," and thus satisfied the clear and convincing evidence
standard. 136 The patient stated in writing the specific conditions in
which she would not desire to be sustained by a respirator. 31
Every competent person can complete a standard living will which
will specify the various types of medical treatment and possible medi-
cal conditions in which the medical support may be used.13  More-
over, these standard living wills reflect the most recent advances in
medical technology. 3 9
Although a living will may not solve the problem of a change in
mind, once in writing, any subsequent change of mind is more likely
to be corrected than if it had been an oral statement made to a friend
133. Id. at 1374.
134. Forty states and the District of Columbia have legislation recognizing that living
wills are valid. In New York, courts have recognized the validity of living wills. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 21, 1989, at B20, col.l; see A Patient's Last Rights, supra note 12, at 1382.
The living will must satisfy the Eichner "clear and convincing" standard for the patient's
desire to be honored. Id. at 1381.
135. 129 Misc. 2d 45, 47, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 512 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1985). The
living will provided in paragraph B:
[i]f, due to injury or illness, sudden or gradual, I become incompetent, and my
condition becomes such that: (1) I am in irreversible coma, in the opinion of
my treating physician; or (2) I have been continuously unconscious for a period
of one (1) week, and in the opinion of my treating physician, I have suffered
severe irreversible brain damage which will permanently render me incompe-
tent (or that even partial physical recovery would be accompanied by severe,
irreversible brain damage rendering me incompetent); or (3) my condition is
terminal and hopeless and death is imminent; then, as of that time, I withdraw
my actual and implied consent to and substitute this REFUSAL of all further
treatment of me by artificial means and devices (such as the use of a respirator)
and all further therapeutic or emergency care; and I direct that all further treat-
ment of me or my condition by such artificial means and devices or the rendi-
tion of such further therapeutic or emergency care shall cease.
Id. at 57, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 512; see also Living Wills, supra note 132, at 1380 n.91.
136. Saunders, 129 Misc.2d at 54, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
137. Id.
138. These forms are available without charge to those who request in writing to the
Society For The Right To Die, located'at 250 West 57th Street, New York, NY, 10107.
The living will must be signed, dated and countersigned by two witnesses; one copy
should be giyen to the individual's physician to be included in medical records. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 21, 1989, at B20, col. 1.
139. Id.
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or relative."4 In addition, one's expressed intention in a living will
may not accurately reflect the current medical procedure being used
on the patient, or the ultimate condition of the patient. 141 If the inten-
tions expressed in the living will do not accurately reflect the individ-
ual's current medical situation, the surrogate can use the living will as
evidence of the patient's subjective intention regarding his medical
care. 142
B. Personal Designation of a Surrogate
As discussed above, New York courts will not appoint a surrogate
to make an informed decision on behalf of the incompetent individ-
ual. 143 Through New York's "durable power of attorney" statute, 44
however, New York courts do allow an individual to personally desig-
nate a surrogate to make medical decisions. Although powers of at-
torney have traditionally been used to delegate authority over
financial matters, the legislature enacted a statute permitting individu-
als to create "springing powers of attorney," which apply to decisions
regarding medical care. 145 When the individual has become incompe-
140. Matter of O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613-14, 534 N.Y.S.2d
886, 892-93 (1988).
[A] person who has troubled to set forth his or her wishes in a writing is more
likely than one who has not to make sure that any subsequent changes of heart
are adequately expressed, either in a new writing or through clear statements to
relatives and friends. In contrast, a person whose expressions of intention were
limited to oral statements may not as fully appreciate the need to 'rescind' those
statements after a change of heart.
Id.
141. See Saunders, 129 Misc. 2d at 54, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
142. Id.
143. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
144. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-1601, -1602 (McKinney 1989)
There is ... no longer any reason in principle why those wishing to appoint
another to express their specific or general desires with respect to medical treat-
ment, in the event they become incompetent, may not do so formally through a
power of attorney.
Matter of O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 528, 531 N.E.2d 607, 612, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 891,
n.2 (1988). A standard power of attorney automatically ends when the donor becomes
incapacitated. Durable powers of attorney, however, are authorized in all states and the
District of Columbia, and remain in effect even when the principal is incompetent, and
thus unable to make an informed decision regarding medical treatment. N.Y. GEN. OB-
LIG. LAW §§ 5-1601, -02 (McKinney 1989). N.Y. Times, July 8, 1989, at B48, col. 3.
145. A springing durable power of attorney is now recognized in 20 states, including
New York and New Jersey. Springing powers "spring" into effect when a specified event
occurs, such as physical or mental incapacity, disappearance, or entry into a nursing
home. A springing power of attorney is often signed when a person is reluctant to give
others wide powers while he or she can still act personally. Id.
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tent, the "springing power of attorney" will come into effect.146
An individual can receive a standard New York Medical Power of
Attorney form, where he can state who is to be appointed as his deci-
sion maker in the event that he is unable to do so, and what specific or
general decisions they may decide on his behalf. 
47
IV. Proposed Statute
On April 1, 1988, Article 29-B of New York Public Health Law
became effective.' 48 This statute allows a patient or a surrogate to
consent in writing to a Do Not Resuscitate Order (DNR Orders). 49
The DNR Order prevents a physician from reviving a patient by ad-
ministering cardiopulmonary resuscitation. 50
This statute provides guidelines concerning such issues as what
constitutes legal capacity 51 and the specific procedures by which a
patient may consent to such an order. 15 2 In addition, the statute sets
forth the procedures by which a surrogate may be appointed for a
patient who is medically incompetent. 153 This surrogate can order the
hospital to refrain from administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation
on the patient's behalf.'5 4 New York Public Health Law does not
provide the means by which an incompetent individual may exercise
his right to refuse medical treatment.15 5 The following is a proposed
addition to Article 29-B of the New York Public Health Law. This
proposal encompasses the right to refuse medical treatment for the
individual incapable of making an informed decision.
56
Right To Refuse Medical Treatment
(1) Purpose:
A patient has the right to refuse medical treatment. A patient
146. All powers of attorney become void when the principal dies; thus, a power of
attorney can never be substituted for a will. Id.
147. A standard form can be bought in an office supply store for the typical power of
attorney. In New York, the Statutory Short Form of General Power of Attorney covers
most situations. To ensure that it will cover incapacitation, however, the document must
state that the power of attorney will remain valid and effective even in the event of inca-
pacitation. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1602 (McKinney 1989); N.Y. Times, July 22,
1989, at C32, col.l.
148. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW art. 29-B (McKinney Supp. 1989).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. § 2961(3).
152. Id. § 2964.
153. Id. § 2965.
154. Id.
155. See Saunders v. New York, 129 Misc. 2d 45, 54, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 515 (1985).
156. N.Y. Pub. Health Law does not provide for a means in which an incompetent
individual may exercise his right to refuse medical treatment.
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may exercise this right after being fully informed, at a minimum, of
his medical condition, the nature of the procedure, the reasonably
foreseeable risks involved, and alternatives for care and treatment.
If the patient is adjudicated incompetent according to state law
or is found by his physician to be medically incapable of under-
standing the nature of the procedure, the reasonably foreseeable
risks, or the alternatives for care or treatment, a surrogate will be
appointed by the court to make an informed decision on his behalf.
(2) Surrogate
(a) A surrogate, to act on behalf of the individual, will be ap-
pointed by the court if the patient is adjudicated incompetent ac-
cording to state law, or is medically incapable of making an
informed decision and has not appointed his own surrogate accord-
ing to the "Durable Power of Attorney" statute. 157
(b) The surrogate shall make a decision based upon any known
beliefs or values of the patient based on the patient's past expres-
sions, or his moral, ethical, religious, or other deeply held belief as
it relates to his desires regarding termination of medical treatment.
If the patient had drafted a living will, the surrogate will use this as
evidence of the patient's subjective intent.
(c) The surrogate shall consider objective factors by consulting
with the attending physician in order to become fully informed of
and understand the condition of the patient, the nature of the pro-
cedure, the reasonably foreseeable risks involved, and alternatives
for care and treatment.
(3) Hospital Ethics Committee
Each hospital shall establish a hospital ethics committee.' 58 The
Committee shall consult with the attending physician and give to
the surrogate an opinion regarding a decision to terminate medical
treatment.
(4) The State's Interest
If the surrogate has decided to terminate medical treatment, and
the matter is brought to court, the court must determine if there
exists a compelling state interest which will override this decision.
These state interests include:
i) an interest in protecting third parties;
157. N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW § 2965 (McKinney Supp. 1989). If the individual,
when competent, has not designated a person to make decisions regarding medical treat-
ment, or does not have a guardian appointed pursuant to article 17-A of the Surrogate's
Court Procedure Act, a surrogate is chosen from a list of family members pursuant to
N.Y. PUn. HEALTH LAW § 2965 (McKinney Supp. 1989).
If no surrogate is available, an attending physician or a hospital may commence a
special proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction for a judgment directing the physi-
cian to act as a surrogate. Id. § 2966.
158. See A Patient's Last Rights, supra note 12, at 1403; Stone, The Right to Die, supra
note 129, at 637.
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ii) an interest in preventing suicide;
iii) an interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical
profession; and
iv) an interest in preservation and sanctity of life.
V. Conclusion
Before a patient can refuse medical treatment, he must be fully in-
formed of, and understand the consequences of such actions so that
any decision is the result of informed consent. If a patient is medically
incapable of giving informed consent, a surrogate should be desig-
nated who would make an informed decision on behalf of this patient.
Currently, the New York courts apply the subjective intent rule,
seeking to ascertain the subjective intentions of the patient before he
lost capacity to render an informed decision by becoming medically
incompetent. Unfortunately, in the event that an individual does not
have the ability, or does not possess the sophistication or foresight to
make his intentions known, his subjective intention cannot be deter-
mined. A surrogate, therefore, should be appointed who would stand
in the shoes of this medically incompetent individual, and consider
the subjective factors of the intent rule as well as the objective factors
of informed consent, so that a decision regarding medical treatment
would reflect the best interest of this individual.
Carol M. Friedman
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